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Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-
The NASD Suitability Rulet
Attempts at self-regulation by the National Association
of Securities Dealers have been particularly unsuccessful
with respect to the sale of "suitable" securities. The
author examines the reasons for this failure, and suggests
that under the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power
to promulgate a rule which will adequately protect and
enforce the principle that investment decisions can be




Article III, section 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) states
that:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange
of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer
as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation
and needs.'
This is the so called "suitability" rule or doctrine. Its purpose
is to protect the increasing numbers of investors in publicly held
corporations, many of whom perforce are unsophisticated, from
sharp and devious practices of unscrupulous securities transac-
tions experts. The rule is part of the self-regulatory ethical
code governing NASD member broker-dealers and registered rep-
resentatives in their dealings with the public and other mem-
bers.2 This paper points out that the NASD has not provided
adequate standards, controls, or enforcement of the rule govern-
ing suitability of recommended securities for particular investors
in light of the individual's financial capabilities, needs, and ob-
jectives. In other words, the NASD suitability rule has failed
as an ethical standard.
t The author wishes to thank Professor David S. Ruder of the
Northwestern University School of Law for his helpful comments.
* Member of Illinois Bar.
1. NATIONAL ASSocIATIoN OF SEcuRiTiES DEALERS, INc., NASD MAN-
UAL D-5 (Reprint 1965) [hereafter cited as NASD MANUAL].
2. NASD, THE NASD Am =H REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE 8 (1964).
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To fulfill the broad purposes of the federal securities laws
of protecting the investing public, it is submitted that the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should incorporate the
suitability rule into its regulation of the securities industry, thus
making compliance with the rule an express legal responsibility.
The SEC, in fact, has promulgated a suitability rule covering
only one small area of the securities business. This is Rule
15c2-5(a) (2) governing the sale of "equity funding programs"
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule states:
(a) It shall constitute a "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
act or practice" as used in section 15(c) (2) of the Act for any
broker or dealer to offer or sell any security to, or attempt to
induce the purchase of any security by, any person, . . . unless
such broker or dealer, before any purchase, loan or other related
element of the transaction is entered into: . . . (2) Obtains
from such person information concerning his financial situation
and needs, reasonably determines that the entire transaction, in-
cluding the loan arrangement, is suitable for such person, and
delivers to such person a written statement setting forth the
basis upon which the broker or dealer made such determination. 3
It should be noted that this SEC rule goes beyond NASD Rule 2
in that the broker-dealer has an affirmative duty to reasonably
determine whether the transaction is suitable for the customer.
The broker-dealer is subject to this duty even when a customer
who is highly sophisticated in the financial world wishes to dis-
regard the unfavorable recommendation. The duty also obtains
in the situation of minimal or no prior contacts between broker-
dealer and customer. Despite the far reaching nature of this
rule, albeit in a limited area, only one letter opposed the suit-
ability aspects of the rule when it was proposed to the industry
for comment. 4
The suitability concept in Rule 15c2-5 (a) (2) can be adapted
to the more general area of the securities business now covered
by NASD Rule 2 by holding it incorporated into the Commis-
sion's so called "shingle theory," which developed in cases of
broker-dealers charging excessive markups and unreasonable
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1964). (Emphasis added.) These pro-
grams involve the purchase of mutual fund shares and the pledging of
these shares to secure a loan, the proceeds of which are then used to pay
the premiums on an insurance policy purchased at about the same time.
The rule also applies to every situation in which a broker-dealer is in-
volved in a money-lending arrangement in connection with the sale of
a security that is not subject to Regulation T of the Federal Reserve
Board. Very few such situations exist, however. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. T
§ 1, 12 C.F.R. § 220.1 (1963).
4. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The
Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DuKE L.J. 445, 455.
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prices in securities transactions. It has long been held that
fraud may be implied where the relationship between two par-
ties, though not of a fiduciary nature, raises a duty to disclose
facts and the disclosure has not been made.5 The SEC began
developing its shingle theory violation of the federal securities
laws along these same lines.6 The shingle theory is based on
the notion that a broker-dealer, by virtue of his opening an office
and "hanging out his shingle," undertakes to deal fairly with his
customers in accordance with the standards of the profession.
The theory was approved in Charles Hughes & Co., where the
Second Circuit upheld the Commission's position that any per-
son, regardless of his knowledge or access to the market and
market information, is entitled to rely on the implied representa-
tion made by a broker-dealer that customers will be treated
fairly.8 The shingle theory has recently been utilized to support
the growth of the "reasonable basis doctrine," which requires
that the broker-dealer make an adequate investigation of the
company and its security prior to recommendation to customers,9
and that he must supply to the investor the material facts upon
which he bases his recommendation.' 0 Use of the shingle theory
to evolve a Commission promulgated suitability rule could be
equally successful. It is suggested that the only reason why such
an evolution has not taken place is the reluctance to expose the
broker-dealer to possible civil liability for a suitability rule viola-
tion in the case in which the broker-dealer has had only mini-
mal contacts with the customer, as opposed to a long standing
relationship."
5. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Arleen W. Hughes,
27 S.E.C. 629 (1948), aff'd, Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
In the opinion of SEC Chairman Cohen, this theory cannot be distin-
guished from the "shingle" theory, and is merely a choice of language
in a particular context. CONFERENCE ON SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION 61(Mundheim ed. 1965).
6. Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). This Was an "excessive
markups" case where the broker-dealer charged his customers for secu-
rities at prices bearing no reasonable relation to the thenf current market
prices for the securities. The court revoked Duker & Duker's registration.
7. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943),
affirming, 13 S.E.C. 676 (1943).
8. 13 S.E.C. 676, 681 (1943).
9. See Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953).
10. See D. F. Bernheimer, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7000,
Jan. 23, 1963.
11. The question of civil liability under the suitability doctrine will
be discussed in connection with the issue of whether the doctrine should
impose an ethical standard or a legal obligation. See text accompanying
notes 78-87 infra.
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II. THE BROKER-DEALER AS AN ADVISER AND
THE NASD
Before any discussion of the suitability doctrine can be un-
dertaken, two preliminary matters must be considered: first,
how the broker-dealer acts as an adviser and, second, the NASD's
relation to the suitability doctrine.
A. THE BROKER-DEALER AS AN ADVISER
The broker-dealer fulfills diverse functions in the investment
community. At various times he is the banker, the dealer, the
broker, the adviser, the market maker, and the professional of
securities transactions. 12 As an adviser he counsels as to what
securities a given customer should or should not own. If he is
engaged only in advising the public as an adviser for a fee, he is
subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 19401 and the at-
tendant special duties arising therefrom. Although most invest-
ment advisory firms do not also engage in the sale of securi-
ties,14 the broker-dealer who advises only incidentally to the
conduct of his business as such and receives no special compensa-
tion is specifically exempted from that act.15 Nonetheless, cer-
tain obvious parallels between advisers and broker-dealers exist.
Both groups want to be known as "professional."' 6 Both groups
are also loosely covered by the phrase "fiduciary and quasi-
fiduciary obligations," indicating their special obligations to
deal fairly with the public above and beyond the ordinary obli-
gations imposed on sellers of other types of merchandise.' 7 As
for broker-dealers, unlike advisers, their obligations to the pur-
chasers of securities they recommend may well be the area in
which legal and ethical obligations have been most frequently
defined and least effectively achieved.' 8 "Suitability" as to
broker-dealers is still "a judicial quest for the holy grail."' 9
12. Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 BOSTON COLLEGE
INDUS. & Com. L. REV. 187, 188 (1965).
13. 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1964).
14. SEC, Report of Special Study of the Securities Markets, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 381 (1963) [hereafter cited
as Special Study].
15. 54 Stat. 849, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (c) (1964).
16. Compare SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 190 (1963); NYSE, ETHICAL CONDUCT: A STUDY GUIDE FOR REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVE TRAINEES OF NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER FIRMS
1, with Special Study, pt. 1, at 240-42.
17. Special Study, pt. 1, at 237.
18. Special Study, pt. 1, at 238.




Self-regulation in the securities industry began in 1933 with
an Investment Bankers Code under the ill-fated NRA.20 It was
soon realized that the desired objectives could not be achieved
without appropriate legislation.21 Senator Maloney, sponsor of
the proposed legislation stated:
The machinery of [the securities] business is delicate. It can
be dislocated either by corruption from within or by unwise and
burdensome regulation from without. Our task is to prevent the
former without the risk of the latter. The [proposed] Act pro-
vides . . . that external restraints should be rendered unneces-
sary as a result of the exercise of self-restraint. 22
In 1939, the NASD was duly registered and approved pursuant
to the Maloney Act23 as a national securities association 24 and
is, in fact, the only association so registered.25 Among the pur-
poses of the NASD are the promotion of high standards of com-
mercial honor, the adoption and enforcement of rules of fair
practice in the securities industry, the promotion of just and
equitable principles of trade for the protection of investors, and
the encouragement of self-discipline among members.26 Today,
over eighty per cent of all registered broker-dealers in the United
States belong to the NASD.
27
A principal function of the NASD is that of self-regulation
of the membership by constant enforcement of its rules and in-
terpretations together with certain rules and regulations of the
SEC and the Federal Reserve Board.28 Trade practice complaints
20. Special Study, pt. 4, at 605; NASD, THE NASD AND THE REGIS-
TERED REPRESENTATIm 4 (1964).
21. Special Study, pt. 4, at 605-06.
22. NASD, NASD: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES TO PROTECT THE PUB-
Lic 4 (1959), quoting Senator Francis T. Maloney, sponser of the Over-
the-Counter Market Act, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1964).
See S. REP. No. 1455 and H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
23. Over-the-Counter Market Act, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 780-3 (1964).
24. Application by NASD, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 627 (1939).
25. COMMoDITY RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS CORP., UNDERSTANDING THE
OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET 19 (1960).
26. See NASD Certificate of Incorporation (Del.) reprinted in
NASD MANUAL at C-1. Note the similarity to the language of the act,
cited supra, note 23.
27. Special Study, pt. 1, at 16.
28. See Special Study, pt. 4, at 646. The NASD exercises controls
in underwriting, over-the-counter retail and wholesale business, mutual
fund distributions, and to some extent over business in listed securities.
Areas not generally covered by NASD surveillance are § 5 of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, the anti-manipulative provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Rule 10b-6 of the Exchange Act, and state securities
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against a member may be brought either by the NASD District
Business Conduct Committee29 or by "any person feeling ag-
grieved." 30  It should be noted that formal, publicly generated
complaints have played a very minor role in NASD enforcement
functions primarily for three reasons. First, if the complaint has
merit the District Business Conduct Committee itself will initiate
the proceedings.31 Second, the burden of going forward is on
the complainant and there is no incentive for an individual to so
proceed since NASD procedures do not presently, and never
have provided for restitution.32 Third, the NASD has operated
for a quarter-century in comparative anonymity, thus, it is
submitted, seriously hampering the fulfillment of its purposes.
The association restricts its members from advertising their
membership in the NASD 33 and, the NASD itself does very little
public relations work.34 Further, only limited publicity is given
to the results of NASD disciplinary proceedings.35
Pursuant to sections 15 (A) (b) (9), and (10) of the Securities
Exchange Act, the NASD has promulgated a Code of Procedure
for Handling Trade Practice Complaints,36 providing for pro-
cedural due process. On application of a person aggrieved or on
the SEC's own motion,37 review by the Commission is provided
laws violations. See also, Boren & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No.
6367, Sept. 19, 1960; Special Study, pt. 4, at 661.
29. NASD MANuAL at D-23.
30. Ibid.
31. Of the 809 disciplinary proceedings disposed of by district
business conduct committees in the period 1959-61, only 28 were
based on formal public complaints. Ten of these complaints
were dismissed, three were withdrawn by the complainant prior
to decision, and only four led to a penalty greater than censure.
Special Study, pt. 4, at 663.
32. Special Study, pt. 4, at 664. NASD MANuAL at D-25 provides
for a maximum fine of $1,000. The other penalties there provided are
censure, suspension, and expulsion from membership pursuant to
15(A) (b) (9) of the Exchange Act.
33. NASD MANUAL at H-11.
34. Special Study, pt. 4, at 616-617.
35. NASD MANUAL at H-9. In a personal interview at the Chicago
district office of the NASD on February 15, 1966, the writer was politely
told he could not gain access to any such information. Until 1962, only
expulsions were made "public." Now, suspensions are also "publicized"
after the appeal period has expired. See generally, Special Study, pt. 4,
at 666, 672.
36. NASD MANUAL, pt. E.
37. See Special Study, pt. 4, at 667, 714-718. In only one instance
has the SEC exercised its power of review on its own motion. See
NASD, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945). It is also interesting to note that the
majority opinion in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963), referred to the provision for review of NASD disciplinary action
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for, both in the Code of Procedure,38 and in section 15 (A) (g) of
the statute. Most NASD proceedings are not reviewed because
no appeal is taken and those cases that are appealed rarely in-
volve the question of the suitability doctrine. In fact, over the
years there have been relatively few violations of rule 2 result-
ing in NASD disciplinary proceedings. 39 As a result, the limits
of the suitability rule have not been defined.
Hi THE SUITABILITY RULE OF THE NASD
The NASD suitability rule derives its basis from a simple,
universally accepted fact-that investment decisions can be made
rationally only in relation to the needs and goals of the person
for whom they are made. This involves both the broker-dealer's
investment judgment and circumstantial knowledge about the
customer's investment-risk limit. In effect, the rule is an at-
tempt to shift the responsibility for making inappropriate invest-
ment decisions from the customer to the broker-dealer.40
A. Tim NEED FOR THE SUITABILITY RULE
There are two reasons why a suitability rule is needed in the
securities business. First, disclosure requirements and practices
have not protected the investor completely. In fact, there can be
situations where disclosure is not enough to protect the investor
even from his own greed. In Phillips & Co.,41 the SEC upheld
NASD suspension of a member for violation of Rules 1 and 2 of
the Association's Rules of Fair Practice when it was shown that
the broker-dealer knew of the limited financial condition of his
customers and yet urged purchase of a highly speculative secur-
ity. The SEC said that the test of a rule 2 violation is whether
the broker-dealer fulfilled the obligation he assumed, when he
undertook to counsel customers, of only making such recommen-
dations as would be consistent with the customer's financial
as possibly distinguishing it (NASD) from Silver and possibly exempt-
ing it from the antitrust laws.
38. NASD MANuAL at E-10.
39. Through 1961, there were a total of 35 proceedings for rule 2
violations, an average of only 2.3% of the total fair practice violations
in each membership year since the inception of the NASD. Special
Study, pt. 1, at 165. The New York Stock Exchange "know your cus-
tomer" rule, NYSE, op. cit. supra note 16, 1 2405 (better known as
NYSE Rule 405), has only recently had the suitability rule interpreted
into it. See, Special Study, pt. 1, at 315-16.
40. Mundheim, supra note 4, at 449.
41. 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
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situation and needs.42 Thus, no matter what is disclosed to the
customer, the suitability rule is needed to help restrain what has
become known as "boiler-room" tactics. A "boiler-room" is a
high pressure broker-dealer engaged solely in the sale of "low-
priced," "speculative," "obscure," "promotional," or "unseasoned"
securities via the telephone to people he does not know (people
on the so called "sucker list"), attempting to persuade them to
make a hasty decision to buy.43 Although the boiler-room cases
have, for the most part, been concerned with violations of the
reasonable basis doctrine, in more recent boiler-room decisions
44
the Commission has said that such high pressure tactics are not
consistent with unhurried and careful presentation and disclosure
of the facts, investment factors applicable to the security recom-
mended, and to a determination of its suitability for purchase by
the customer in light of his particular financial situation and in-
vestment objectives. Thus, the need for greater enforcement of
rule 2 is evidently beginning to be recognized.
Second, as has been pointed out, broker-dealers have a spe-
cial relation with the investing public.45 The public is encour-
aged to, and does, rely on the superior skill of the broker-dealer
community in its security transactions. 46 The principles of rule
2 place the burden of guarding against inappropriate investment
decisions on those who claim to, and in most cases do, have
superior skill. The net effect of invoking NASD Rule 2 is to
raise the presumption that the customer has relied on the broker-
dealer, thus making proof of such reliance unnecessary. The
broker-dealer can, of course, rebut the presumption by showing
that he was merely an order clerk in the transaction.47 The
findings of the Special Study have shown that because of the
complex nature of the securities markets, and the reliance which
the investing public places upon the competence and character
of professionals in those markets, the investing public is sub-
jected to undue hazards.48 Use and enforcement of the suit-
42. Id. at 70. On inadequacy of disclosure in relation to the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, see the bizarre Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947).
43. CONFERENCE ON SEcuRcITs REGULATION 69 (Mundheim ed. 1965).
Boiler-rooms and the expansion of the suitability doctrine will be dis-
cussed at a later point. See text accompanying notes 61-62, infra.
44. See, e.g., Norman Joseph Adams, SEC Exchange Act Release No.
7072, April 30, 1963; Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No.
6846, July 11, 1962, affd sub nom., Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.
1963); Best Sec., Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960.
45. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
46. Mundheim, supra note 4, at 450.
47. Ibid.
48. See, S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1963).
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ability rule would greatly aid in the elimination of undue haz-
ards growing out of reliance on broker-dealers in securities trans-
actions.
B. SEC TREATmENT OF NASD RuLE 2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Among the earliest NASD Rule 2 disciplinary proceedings
reviewed by the SEC were the "excessive trading" cases. In
E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc.,49 the funds of a religious and charitable
corporation were "churned" by the broker-dealer, that is, the
officers reposed complete trust and confidence in the broker-
dealer who abused that trust and confidence by causing an ex-
cessive number of transactions with the funds at prices not rea-
sonably related to the market. In upholding the NASD's finding
of a rule 2 violation, the Commission said that the test was
not one of power given to the broker-dealer, but rather one of
his status in relation to his customer and how he used that status
to induce churning.50
Two recent Commission decisions reviewing NASD findings
of suitability rule violations involved the recommendation of the
broker-dealer's own high risk securities to customers. In Powell
& McGowan, Inc.,51 the self-serving recommendation was held so
grossly inappropriate and such a high risk as to constitute
overreaching. In C. Gilman Johnston,2 the Commission "dis-
missed review" 53 of an NASD Rule 2 violation finding, even
though no evidence concerning customers was offered. The Com-
mission said that since the salesmen were inexperienced, there
were no reasonable grounds for them to believe that they could
make a suitability determination for their customers and, under
these circumstances, this was enough for the NASD to find the
suitability rule violated. The broker-dealer's motivation or in-
tention was held to be of no consequence by the Commission,
agreeing with an NASD ruling in First Securities Corp.5 4 In the
49. 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945). The Commission has treated excessive
trading cases as anti-fraud violations of the securities laws.
50. In another excessive trading case, where the SEC held that the
NASD suitability rule had been violated, the NASD rules generally were
held not to be an unconstitutional delegation of power to the association.
R. H. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180, affd, R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198
F.2d 690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); accord, Boren & Co.,
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6367, Sept. 19, 1960.
51. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7302, April 24, 1964.
52. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7390, Aug. 14, 1964.
53. Procedurally, when the SEC affirms the findings of the NASD
disciplinary proceeding, it dismisses review of that proceeding.
54. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6497, March 20, 1961.
19661
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
latter case, the broker-dealer had intimate knowledge of the
limited financial circumstances and needs of his elderly widow
customer and yet proceeded to "churn" her portfolio. The stand-
ard set in applying rule 2 was based on the financial situation,
holdings, and needs of the particular customer involved. Thus,
in the relatively few cases where the Commission has dealt with
NASD Rule 2, the suitability test has become the use by the
broker-dealer of his special status in relation to the particular
customer, with a de-emphasis of any element of broker-dealer
intent.
The high-water mark of NASD Rule 2 was reached in Gerald
M. Greenberg,5 where a boiler-shop, selling low-priced, specula-
tive securities, was held to have violated the suitability rule. It
was conceded by the respondent that at least some of the sales
may not have been suitable. The Commission, in upholding the
respondents' expulsion from the NASD, indicated that since the
broker-dealer had no knowledge of and made no attempt to ob-
tain information concerning the customer's other security hold-
ings, his financial situation, and his needs and objectives, the
broker-dealer was not in a position to judge the suitability of
the recommendation." Thus, the NASD and the SEC were
seemingly placing an affirmative duty on the broker-dealer to
attempt to obtain such information, abrogating the language of
NASD Rule 2 that recommendations be suitable "upon the basis
of the facts, if any, disclosed" by the customer. The NASD's
recent decision in proceedings against Shearson, Hammill &
Co.,5 7 though, raises a question of whether there has been a re-
treat from the Greenberg holdhg. In that case the NASD
Board of Governors dismissed charges of a rule 2 violation
against a salesman found to have no knowledge of his customer's
financial situation and needs while upholding the charge against
a salesman who did have such knowledge. The Special Study
has concluded,58 and it is submitted here, that under this latter
holding, the NASD is defeating the purpose of its own suitability
rule by effectively permitting recommendations of low priced,
speculative securities to unknown customers.
55. 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960).
56. Id. at 137, 138.
57. See Special Study, pt. 1 at 280-299, affd by SEC, SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 7743, Nov. 12, 1965.
58. Special Study, pt. 1 at 312. In the affirmance by the Commis-
sion, it was held to be an anti-fraud violation where known facts should
have caused further inquiry on the part of the salesman. See SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 7743, 21-23, Nov. 12, 1965.
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The last few years, in fact, have seen standards of broker-
dealer responsibility under the suitability concept expand be-
yond the simple situation where fraud was easily found59 into
two main areas. The first area is where no degree of disclosure
would permit the investor involved to make a rational invest-
ment. Such was the case in Powell & McGowan, Inc.,60 where
the broker-dealer knew he was recommending high risk securi-
ties to a 79 year old customer who was senile, retired, and living
alone. One more element of responsibility was placed on the
broker-dealer by this case-that of determining whether his cus-
tomer can utilize any information disclosed in reaching an in-
vestment decision as part of the suitability rule. 1 Thus ex-
panded, the suitability rule in this area would not allow the
broker-dealer to relieve himself of its requirements by mere dis-
closure.
The second area wherein there has been expanded use of
the suitability rule, apart from the trust and confidence situa-
tions and cases of obvious overreaching, is in the boiler-room
cases as represented by Greenberg and Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
discussed earlier. It has been this area, and, indeed, these two
cases, that seemingly has given rise to the current and probably
most important issue with respect to the suitability rule-wheth-
er it should be a legal responsibility or a self-regulatory ethical
standard.
IV. SUITABILITY-ETHICAL PRINCIPLE OR
LEGAL DUTY?
The concept of suitability originated with the NASD as an
ethical principle,62 and the association has taken the leadership
in its development. 63 However, until after the Special Study
was released, the NASD did not materially act to set any gen-
59. See, e.g., Hammill & Co., 28 S.E.C. 634 (1948), where non-
disclosure in violation of rule 10b-5 was found when the broker-dealer,
knowing the financial circumstances and needs of a 61 year old widow
who completely relied on his recommendations, sold his customer a
partnership interest in his failing securities firm.
60. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7302, April 24, 1964.
61. Cf. note 41 supra and accompanying text, implying that the
test is not whether the customer has made a considered investment, but
whether the broker-dealer has fulfilled his obligation of making only
suitable recommendations. Accord, First Securities Corp., SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 6497, March 20, 1961.
62. CONFERENCE ON SEcuRrTsS REGULATION 103 (Mundheim ed.
1965).
63. See Special Study, pt. 4, at 669.
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eral standards for this ethical principle. Then, on November 1,
1964, the association promulgated a three page Interpretation on
Fair Dealing with Customers.6 4  The Interpretation begins by
stating that:
[IJmplicit in all ... relationships with customers .. . is the
fundamental responsibility for fair dealing .... [S] ales efforts
must be judged on the basis of whether they can be reasonably
said to represent fair treatment for the persons to whom the
sales efforts are directed, rather than on the argument that they
result in profits to customers.6 5
Then follow five examples of practices that violate this respon-
sibility: recommending speculative, low-priced securities, espe-
cially in "high pressure telephonic sales campaigns;" 66 churning
or excessive trading; short term trading in mutual funds; "fraud-
ulent conduct;" and recommending purchases beyond the custo-
mer's capability to meet such a commitment.61  The Interpre-
tation ends by stating that the enumerated practices are not all
inclusive and that "Usually, any breach of the obligation of fair
dealing as determined by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws could
be considered a violation of the Association's Rules of Fair
Practice." 68
This Interpretation has served only to confuse the basic
issue at hand. Although promulgated as an ethical standard, it
has legal overtones when it uses "churning" as one of its major
examples.6 9 Further, the Interpretation does not really set up a
general suitability doctrine except that confined to speculative,
low-priced securities, even though the Special Study recom-
mended a general expansion of the rule.7 0
A. CHANGING AN ETHIcAL STANDARD INTO A BASIS FOR LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITY
At the present time, it can be argued that the broker-dealer
64. NASD MANUAL at G-7.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. This example bears a close resemblance to the Greenberg
situation. See CONFERENCE ON Scuai-s REGULATION 99 (Mundheim ed.
1965).
67. "This [last] example was drafted to cover the situation where
shares in a mutual fund are sold under a contractual plan to persons
who cannot afford the monthly payments." Mundheim, Professional
Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 445, 461 n.44.
68. NASD MANUAL at G-9.
69. See E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1965).
70. See Special Study, pt. 1, at 328 for the full recommendation.
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has no duty to affirmatively seek information on his customer's
resources and needs, 71 save, possibly, for the boiler-room situa-
tion described in the Interpretation's first example and Green-
berg. "There is, however, no reason to anticipate that the Com-
mission and its staff will necessarily treat it [the Interpretation]
as the final word over the long run. ' 72 Various problems can be
foreseen if this affirmative duty is placed on broker-dealers.
First, "the Commission would be passing on the merits of securi-
ties on a qualitative basis"73 every time it reviewed an NASD
Rule 2 violation proceeding. Second,
the regulatory bodies will not be concerned merely with the
conduct of the broker-dealer in effecting the transaction (which
is where regulation has had its impact in the past), but they
will be passing upon the terms of the transaction, for if a broker-
dealer sells a security which is unsuitable, the purchaser would
have a right of rescission or at least a right to recover damages.74
Thus by using an ethical standard as a basis for legal respon-
sibility0 the Commission would be "opening the floodgates" of
litigation.
Regarding the question of the passing on the merits of securi-
ties, although the Commission has no authority to do so, 7 6 it can
be said that it has been engaged in this activity, at least indi-
rectly, in the past.77 Admittedly, the SEC has never passed on
the merits of a particular security as it relates to an individual
or class of individuals, which would be the result of extending
the suitability rule, but such is not inconceivable or unacceptable,
for state governments do it frequently under the so-called Blue
Sky Laws.
The only instances where the suitability concept has been
carried over into a legal responsibility is in the context of a
boiler-room sale7 8 where rule 2 violations are readily discern-
able. As yet, there appears to be no case holding a broker-
71. NASD, 1964 Report to Members 8 (1964).
72. CONFERENCE ON SEcuRiTEs REGULATION 99 (Mundheim ed. 1965).
But see Mundheim, supra note 67, at 463 n.54.
73. Ibid.
74. Id. at 100.
75. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
187, 190, 191 (1963), where a conversion of an ethical standard into a
duty, the violation of which amounted to fraud, seems to have been
made.
76. See 1 Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 130 (2d ed. 1961).
77. Cf. Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249, 251 (1947), where, in another
context, the Commission deemed it "necessary to warn the investing
public" of the quality of the security there involved.




dealer civilly liable in damages on the ground that unsuitable
securities were recommended and sold to a customer. 9 In
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,80 it was held that NASD
rules do not give rise to a federal private claim upon which relief
can be granted. However, there remains the possibility that if
the NASD does not expand the suitability rule, the courts will.
This was done in Anderson v. Knox,81 an analogous insurance
case where the defendant insurance agent was held liable for
recommending an unsuitable insurance plan to plaintiff and his
wife. Liability there was predicated on: (1) the fact that insur-
ance is a complex business; (2) a holding out of the agent as an
expert in the field; and (3) the relative lack of sophistication of
the customer. As pointed out earlier,8 2 the securities industry is
extremely complex, and the broker-dealer is heavily relied upon
as an expert by the investing public.
There appear to be factors warranting the conclusion that
the courts would and should become involved in enforcement of
the suitability doctrine. First, the NASD has no power to assure
that the customer injured by a suitability violation will be
made whole.8 3 This fact alone may be enough to persuade a
court that the association, contrary to the purpose of the federal
securities laws, is unable to effectively protect investors in this
area. Second, and more importantly, notwithstanding the in-
dustry's long promotion of an image of professionalism, the pri-
mary emphasis of the securities business is on selling securities.8 4
79. Mundheim, supra note 67, at 465. It has been intimated to the
writer that there is at least one such suit pending.
80. CCH FED. SEc. L. R Fi. 1 91351 (S.D.N.Y. March 20, 1964), affd,
358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). In affirming, however, Judge Friendly
indicated that some rules, especially when the rule imposes an explicit
duty unknown to the common law, may indeed give rise to an implied
federal right of action. See also O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d
Cir. 1964).
81. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962).
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp.
373 (S.D. Tex. 1965), the court implied that it would place such a duty
on broker-dealers to affirmatively seek information on the customer's
resources and needs. The actual question was not reached because the
court held the NASD suitability rule satisfied in this case since the de-
fendant customer had "demonstrated his financial acumen ... and that
he was a suitable person and a prudent one in which to make a trans-
action of the size of the short sale" involved. Id. at 376.
82. See notes 16, 17, 46 supra, and accompanying text.
83. NASD MANUAL at D-25. Under present rules the largest fine
that the NASD can impose is $1,000. This is not restitutionary, but is
penal in nature.
84. This is conceded by the Vice-President and General Counsel
of the NASD, Marc A. White, in CONTERENCE ON SEcu aTs REGULATION
28 (Mundheim ed. 1965).
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In reality, registered representatives are salesmen, and clients
are customers. In this light, the conflict between the broker-
dealer's merchandising function and his "special obligations" to
his customers 5 in the suitability area becomes readily apparent.
The NASD has not succeeded in defining meaningful standards
of conduct in this area because of this conflict in the functions of
the securities business itself. When the NASD has acted, its
actions have been initiated for the most part by the SEC.86 One
student of the subject has concluded:
[T]he NASD is essentially a trade organization; and like every
trade organization, should possess self-regulating powers. It is
doubtful whether at this stage the NASD should be expected to
do more than regulate the relations between its members under
the supervision of the SEC. In a decade, it had proved incapable
of establishing accepted standards of behavior for the activities
of the trade. Neither was it capable of solving problems in a
selfless manner. It has acted like a trade organization and
should be recognized as such.87
B. A PROPOSED SEC RULE ON SurAEI.rrY
Under the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,88 the SEC
is given the responsibility, identical to that imposed on the NASD,
of promulgating rules and regulations designed to promote just
and equitable principles of trade with regard to broker-dealers
not members of a registered securities association. Thus, the
Commission may now expressly articulate its own suitability
rule for this limited group of broker-dealers, and under the rea-
soning of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,8 9 civil liability may ensue
against them. If, however, the basic investor protection purpose
of the securities laws is not to be lost, the SEC should actively
evolve a suitability concept for the entire broker-dealer com-
munity. The Commission could do so under the anti-fraud provi-
sions and the shingle theory, 0 and in this way preserve the ba-
sic purpose of the securities laws where the NASD has failed.
First, such a rule need not make the broker-dealer a virtual in-
surer and no attempt need be made to provide a standard for
evaluating various systems of security analysis or the decisions
85. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
86. Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 BOSTON COLLEGE
INDus. & Com. L. REv. 187, 217 (1965).
87. Ibid.
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(b) (8)-(10), as amended,
78 Stat. 572-573 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 780 (Supp. 1965).
89. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 809 (1965).
90. See text following note 8, supra. See also CONFERENCE ON SE-
cuRms REGULATION 99 (Mundheim ed. 1965).
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made as a result of such analyses. The rule, rather, should be
procedural in nature. Second, since a suitability concept relates
suitability of a particular security to the investment risk limit of
a particular customer, the broker-dealer should be required to
make a reasonable effort to obtain such information from the
customer as a matter of routine in the course of doing business.
Third, the rule should make it abundantly clear that suitability
at the time of recommendation is the issue and that subsequent
performance of the security is not relevant to the inquiry. This
would act as a stop-gap to any potential protracted litigation by
disgruntled investors who, when the market takes a turn to
their detriment, tend to blame their broker-dealer instead of the
outside forces involved. Fourth, when the customer decides to
change his investment objectives (which changes his suitability
requirements), the broker-dealer should at least ascertain that
the customer understands the investment risks involved in the
changed objectives. These risks should be explained by the
broker-dealer in relation to the customer's financial situation as
known to him. If, nevertheless, the customer persists on adher-
ence to the changed objectives, the broker-dealer should be
allowed to advise him about securities that, in the broker-deal-
er's judgment, conform to the new objective and purchase for
him the securities which the customer selects. However, the
broker-dealer should not, as long as he thinks that the securities
are inappropriate in light of the customer's financial situation as
known to him, be permitted to solicit the customer's purchase
of any such inappropriate securities. If the broker-dealer com-
plied with the minimal requirements of this proposed rule, there
would be no violation of the rule upon which to ground civil
liability. Beyond these standards the broker-dealer would be no
more than an order clerk to whom the suitability rule would
not apply.
V. CONCLUSION
In early 1962, over 17 million individuals held shares in
publicly held corporations9' and were serviced by over 6,000
broker-dealer firms.92 These figures are probably greater today,
leading to the conclusion that, without additional rules and
standards of conduct in this vast and complex segment of our
economy, chaos could result. To a great extent the NASD has
been successful in carrying out its responsibilities to provide
91. Special Study, pt. 1, at 10.
92. Id. at 16.
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such rules and standards of conduct for broker-dealers.9 3 In the
area now covered by NASD Rule 2, however, it is clear that
the NASD has not and cannot succeed in its enforcement respon-
sibilities due to the inherently conflicting position in which the
self-regulatory body finds itself. The suitability concept seems
to be so bound up with the shingle theory and the anti-fraud
provisions in the securities laws that the SEC would probably
be a better source from which such a rule should emanate, due
to the "delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory rela-
tionship."94 Such a rule need not be an onerous burden or
threat to the broker-dealer community, if carefully drafted and
enforced as herein proposed. It may, in fact, lead to acceptance
of that status of professionalism that the broker-dealer com-
munity has been claiming for so many years.
93. See 2 Loss, SECURrIES REGULATION 1389-91 (2d ed. 1961); Grant,
The National Association of Securities Dealers: Its Origin and Operation,
1942 Wis. L. REV. 597; Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the
Securities Business, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 518 (1952); White, Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 250
(1959). But see Hed-Hofmann, supra note 86.
94. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191
(1963); 2 Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961).
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